

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY

April 27, 1959

Mr. Murphy:

SUBJECT: Attendance at your 5:30 intra-Department meeting today on Berlin contingency planning.

The following will be present:

EUR Mr. Kohler
 Mr. Armitage (EE)
 Mr. Vigderman (GER)

S/P Mr. Mathews
 Mr. Morgan

W Mr. Graham Martin ✓ *Handwritten initials*

INR Mr. Allan Evans (Francis Williamson
 will take over when he returns from
 Western Europe. John Keppel will also
 be available as required - he now
 serves on the Special Berlin Intelligence
 Committee.)

P Mr. Kretzmann

Would you like an officer assigned from the Secretariat to monitor the meetings?

Yes

No

cc: S/P - Mr. Morgan

DJF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

90 1068-326

SECRET

DRAFT

April 27, 1959.

HARASSMENT AS A BERLIN COUNTERMEASURE

It seems likely that if the USSR decides to make trouble over access to Berlin, it (or the GDR) will do so by degrees rather than by a sudden total blockade. It therefore seems desirable to plan various degrees of counter-harassment, held ready for quick application by the Three Western Powers in case of need.

Some of the most appropriate targets might be Soviet or GDR ships and planes. Harassment should be applied in ways which are as nearly as possible symmetrical in kind and degree with Soviet/GDR harassment of Berlin traffic. Thus if an Allied convoy is held up for three days, one Soviet ship might be detained three days in an Allied port; if an Allied plane is buzzed in the corridor, a Soviet plane might be buzzed while over Allied territory. If unacceptable documentary procedures are demanded by GDR officials, comparable documentary procedures unacceptable to the USSR might be required before Soviet ships or planes are allowed to clear Allied ports. If the Berlin situation becomes serious, a pacific blockade of Soviet/GDR shipping might be imposed at the Danish Belts and Kiel Canal.

Such measures would by no means be certain to make the USSR back down, but reciprocal treatment of the USSR has been found useful in such matters as visas and travel restrictions and might prove so in the present instance, as a supplement to political and propaganda pressures and a warrant of Allied preparedness to act as well as talk.

SECRET

90 1068-327

2 P

~~SECRET~~

CHECKLIST FOR 5:30 MEETING, APRIL 27

1. Purpose of the meeting.
2. Use of the papers with Allies:
 - a. Non-military: EUR has a suggestion.
 - b. Military: get a progress report from Norstad in a week or two and then decide, or couch our recommendation in such general terms that we are in effect free to play by ear?
3. Further study of harassment: S/P has a proposal.
4. Preparatory measures to be developed primarily by State:
 - a. Diplomatic campaign: In addition to NATO consultations, EE has made a start with reference to non-NATO countries, and might be asked to continue on this, with bureaus concerned.
 - b. Propaganda campaign: Kretzmann might take the lead, in consultation with other bureaus concerned.
 - c. Enlist cooperation of allies in both campaigns.
 - d. Secure agreement of UK and France as soon as possible on UN aspect of contingency plans.
5. Further planning of main countermeasures, especially selection and timing.
 - a. General review of what this means.
 - b. Should the papers be sent to Bonn, especially re air access planning? Is Presidential approval required?
6. Bert Mathews has a question re initial probe.
7. Relation of the new interagency group to Foy Kohler's interagency Berlin committee.

~~SECRET~~

90 1068-328